

“They made the momentum real”

An evaluation of the contribution made by STOPAIDS
to the £1 billion UK Global Fund pledge

April 2014

Rebekah Webb Consulting
6 Greenford View
Maiden Newton, Dorset, DT2 0AS
07855 578288
rebekahwebbconsulting@gmail.com

Table of Contents

Summary of Findings.....	3
Introduction.....	4
Methodology.....	4
Who is STOPAIDS?	6
The UK relationship with the Global Fund: 2010-2013	6
Causal Stories: Why did the UK pledge £1 billion to the Global Fund?.....	8
Causal Story A: DfID funded the Global Fund with £1 billion because it was in line with key policy objectives and priorities, including value for money and results	9
Causal Story B: DfID funded the Global Fund with £1 billion because of external pressure from the US government, specifically via the personal intervention of President Obama directly to the UK Prime Minister.....	11
Causal Story C: DfID funded the Global Fund with £1 billion because of external pressure from a well-orchestrated and wide-reaching UK campaign for £1 billion led by STOPAIDS	13
Defining the specific contribution of STOPAIDS	23
Conclusion	26

Summary of Findings

Between 2010 and 2013, STOPAIDS undertook an intensive campaign to secure a renewed pledge to the Global Fund from the UK government. In September 2013, DfID announced a commitment of £1 billion to the Global Fund over three years as part of the Fourth Replenishment Round. STOPAIDS commissioned an independent evaluation to assess and define the specific contribution that their targeted advocacy contributed to this outcome.

Via in-depth interviews with individuals close to the decision-making process and by tracing a timeline of events going back over a number of years, the evaluation revealed a range of competing and largely over-lapping explanations for why DfID gave £1 billion to the Global Fund.

There is some evidence to support the argument that the UK would have pledged £1 billion anyway, in the absence of any external pressure. Following reforms, the Global Fund met a number of key criteria for DfID in terms of the need to spend, to be able to track results and to be confident in value for money. It also helped the UK to deliver on its manifesto commitment on malaria, strongly supported by the Treasurer.

The evaluation however found that the US government as host of the Fourth Replenishment played a key role in preparing UK Prime Minister David Cameron to support a large pledge. The case was also made by a group of influential and persuasive individuals including Elton John, Bono and Bill Gates.

Notwithstanding these factors, ultimately it is doubtful that DfID would have funded the Global Fund with \$1 billion without the support of the British public. Strong testimony from civil servants and other key informants identified a causal link between the pledge, the £1 billion amount, strong public support and the actions of STOPAIDS, specifically the advocacy working group that included ONE, Results UK, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance and Malaria No More.

STOPAIDS was at the centre of a strong campaign for £1 billion that fully engaged both Houses of Parliament, the development sector, student campaigners and a national network of committed British citizens, thus delivering a constituency of support and make it a 'political win' for the new Secretary of State Justine Greening.

The evaluation concluded that DfID funded the Global Fund with £1 billion because the Secretary of State was fully persuaded that it was in line with key policy objectives and internal priorities, and that it was in DfID's best interests to do so, by a range of external actors including the US government, and a well-orchestrated and wide-reaching campaign for £1 billion led by STOPAIDS.

Introduction

STOPAIDS is a network of 80 UK agencies working on the response to HIV and AIDS globally. Founded in 1986, the network was a key part of the international movement calling for the creation of the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and malaria (Global Fund) in the late nineties and early 2000s and has been a strong advocate ever since.

Between 2010 and 2013, STOPAIDS undertook an intensive campaign to secure a renewed pledge from the UK government. The campaign priorities for 2011-2013 set out a 10 point plan that included a doubling of the UK contribution to the Global Fund. A £1 billion replenishment from the UK to the Global Fund was later articulated in the organisational advocacy strategy for 2013-2016 as one of four priorities essential to the next stage of the global AIDS response.

STOPAIDS advocacy work in this area was supported during this period by the Elton John AIDS Foundation (EJAF) and the Open Society Fund. STOPAIDS estimates that about 30% of its organisational resources were dedicated to advocacy in support of the Global Fund between 2010 and 2013.

In September 2013, the UK Department for International Development (DfID) announced a pledge of £1 billion pounds to the Global Fund¹. According to the Global Fund, the pledge was “at the edge of our most optimistic projections - the best possible outcome we could expect”².

STOPAIDS has commissioned independent consultant Rebekah Webb to undertake a targeted evaluation designed to assess and define the specific contribution that advocacy by STOPAIDS contributed to this outcome.

Methodology

The evaluation was designed to be deliverable within a short timeframe and constituted seven days of consultancy time. It combined the traditional qualitative methods of key informant interviews and focus group discussion with a new non-experimental method known as ‘process tracing’ to establish the contribution made by STOPAIDS to the funding announcement.

Process tracing is a qualitative research approach that has been piloted by Oxfam UK as a method of contribution analysis that is especially suited to advocacy impact assessment. A process induction identifies all salient, plausible, causal explanations for the outcome. Process verification then assesses the extent to which each causal story is supported, or not,

¹ <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-life-saved-every-three-minutes-britain-leads-the-way-in-fight-against-hiv-aids-tb-and-malaria>

² Key informant interview, attribution permission granted.

by the evidence³. As with other forms of contribution analysis, the method does not seek to definitively prove contribution but seeks to provide plausible evidence to reduce the uncertainty about the ‘difference’ a program has made⁴. This methodology has been adapted for use in this short-term evaluation, looking for evidence that the intervention by STOPAIDS made a crucial contribution to the outcome.

The primary sources referred to in the evaluation process included STOPAIDS internal documentation, newsletters, press releases, press clippings, social media and external reports.

A total of 19 semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of stakeholders between Monday 24th February and 20th March:

- STOPAIDS current and former staff and trustees
- All members of the STOPAIDS Global Fund advocacy working group
- Policymakers (including key civil servants) directly involved in the decision to fund the Global Fund
- Global Fund staff and board members
- Current and former policy advisors of the All Party Parliamentary Group on HIV and AIDS
- Key informants/bellwethers

Wherever possible, interviewees were not informed of the specific focus of the evaluation in order to ensure unprompted responses. This included asking key informants to cite advocacy successes by STOPAIDS at a very early stage of the interview, and using bellwether interview methodology⁵.

On 5th March 2014, a focus group session was held at the STOPAIDS secretariat office with all staff to reconstruct a timeline for the campaign, explore the theory of change and advocacy strategy behind it and agree on the causal stories.

The Evaluator faced a number of limitations in the research process. The list of key stakeholders was provided by STOPAIDS and therefore potentially biased towards those most familiar with STOPAIDS activities. Interviewees were asked to remember events that happened up to two years ago and are therefore subject to recall bias. The Evaluator was only able to secure one additional bellwether interview via her personal contacts. Unfortunately, it was not possible to secure interviews with MPs and Peers, the former or current Secretary of State, the Permanent Under Secretary of State (PUSS) or her advisor. In addition, it was not possible in the available timeframe and budget to interview members of STOPAIDS that were inactive in the campaign, or likewise campaign allies in Europe and the United States.

³ Process Tracing Draft Protocol, Oxfam 2013

⁴ Mayne, J. 2001. Addressing Attribution through Contribution Analysis: Using Performance Measures Sensibly, Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation, 16 (1), pp. 1-24.

⁵ The Evaluation Exchange XIII 1, Harvard Family Research Project, 2012.

Who is STOPAIDS?

STOPAIDS is a network of 80 UK agencies working on the response to HIV and AIDS globally. Its mission is to initiate, unite and support strong UK leadership on the global response to HIV and AIDS across Government, civil society and other relevant actors.

The network is a member-led democracy where decisions are made through processes which achieve consensus and, where this is not possible, through a Board of Trustees elected from its membership. Day-to-day responsibilities are handed to a staff team of five which is responsible for maintaining robust and transparent processes of convening. A proportion of the membership income is used to part-fund the post of the Policy Officer at the All-Party Parliamentary Group on HIV and AIDS (APPGHIV and AIDS), a backbench cross-party group of MPs and Peers in the UK Parliament at Westminster and the role of Student Stop AIDS Campaign Coordinator, based at Restless Development.

STOPAIDS aims to achieve its impact through its membership, which works directly with more than 130 million people worldwide, and by engaging decision-makers through the development of policy, identifying best practice, lobbying and conducting public campaigns:

STOPAIDS raises a united voice to rally and maintain the UK's leadership in the global response to HIV. It aims to give decision-makers the proof – and the push – they need to make the right, smart choices to help improve the lives of the millions of people around the world needing HIV treatment, prevention, care and support⁶.

The term STOPAIDS can be used to refer to either the secretariat of the network, or the network as a whole. In this report the term STOPAIDS will be used to refer to the secretariat, unless otherwise stated.

The UK relationship with the Global Fund: 2010-2013

In March 2010, the Global Fund announced its third voluntary replenishment cycle, with a call for at least \$13 billion in 2011-13 to ‘allow for the continuation of funding of existing programs’⁷. Following the UK general election in May 2010, a Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) was commissioned by DfID to ensure ‘the greatest possible value for money from our development budget’⁸ within the 0.7% ODA commitment. Since the MAR was conducted in the latter part of 2010, the UK did not make a pledge at the replenishment round in New

⁶ STOPAIDS internal literature.

⁷ Global Fund press release 24 March 2010: Available at: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/mediacenter/newsreleases/2010-03-24_Donors_meet_to_assess_Global_Fund_resource_needs/

⁸ Multilateral Aid Review, March 2011. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67583/multilateral_aid_review.pdf

York. Published in March 2011, the MAR rated the Global Fund as one of the highest-performing multilateral organisations with ‘very high standards for financial management and audit’⁹. It concluded that the Global Fund represented ‘very good value for money’¹⁰.

Global Fund crisis

In early 2011 however, reports of corruption engulfed the Global Fund in scandal, ultimately resulting in the resignation of the Executive Director Michel Kazatchkine and the appointment of a General Manager, Gabriel Jaramillo at the beginning of 2012. A High Level Panel was convened in March 2011 to examine the Global Fund’s financial management. In November, the eleventh round of grant-making (“Round 11”) was suspended due to fears of inadequate funding.

In autumn 2011, Simon Bland, the DfID representative in Geneva, was appointed Chair of the Global Fund Board, and played a key leadership role in the reform process which ran until the hiring of CEO Dr Mark Dybul in late 2012.

International Development Committee (IDC) Enquiry

On Wednesday 22nd February 2012, in response to a request from Ivan Lewis MP¹¹, the IDC resolved to inquire into the Global Fund and considered the matter at two further meetings in March. A hearing was convened on 17th April, at which Secretary of State Andrew Mitchell confirmed that the UK would ‘up to double’ its commitment to the Global Fund - but it would be unlikely until 2013 and dependent upon the results of the ‘mini-MAR’:

That process will enable us to see whether or not the reforms that the MAR and the general manager identified have been made. It will be that analysis of whether or not the British taxpayer will get value for money for this investment that will determine what could be a very significant uplift, but I am sure the Committee will understand that I must be led by the evidence that the Global Fund has made the changes.¹²

The IDC report published in May concluded:

Ministers had committed over a year ago to increase funds to the Global Fund but this money has not yet been delivered nor the amount of the increase confirmed. The Committee is concerned by the delay in delivering funds and is calling for the UK to

⁹ <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/international-development-committee/news/substantive-global-fund-report-notice/>

¹⁰ Multilateral Aid Review, March 2011. Available at:

www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67583/multilateral_aid_review.pdf

¹¹ Labour Shadow International Development Team Newsletter, 2nd February 2012.

¹² <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmintdev/126/120417.htm>

increase its contribution to the Global Fund significantly - over and above the current £384m pledge for 2012 to 2015 - subject to reform¹³.

The government's lingering hesitation over the Fund was further made clear in its response to the IDC enquiry on 18th September 2012:

The Government has disagreed with several of the recommendations made by the IDC, most notably around the impact that the cancellation of Round 11 will have on the delivery of programmes and the timing of the UK Government's increased announcement.

Although the organisation itself has transformed, this has yet to be felt on the ground through improved performance, fewer burdens on countries when applying for funds, fewer delays and quicker disbursements. The earlier the Government makes an announcement, the less evidence there will be, and therefore the more caveats the Government may have to attach to any future increase.

In September 2012, a cabinet re-shuffle led to Andrew Mitchell being moved to government chief whip, and he was replaced by Justine Greening. The new Secretary of State made no changes to the planned 'mini-MAR' two years on from the MAR.

Fourth Replenishment

In April 2013, the Global Fund launched its Fourth Replenishment, seeking financing for the period 2014-2016, and announced that the pledging conference would be held in Washington DC in December.

On 24th July 2013, the DfID 'Multilateral Aid Review Update 2013 Interim Report' stated that the Global Fund had made 'reasonable progress' on specific reform priorities identified in the 2011 MAR. Two months later, at the UN General Assembly on 23rd September 2013, the Secretary of State announced £1 billion for the Global Fund, to 'save a life every minute for the next three years'¹⁴. In December, the Replenishment achieved \$12 billion.

Causal Stories: Why did the UK pledge £1 billion to the Global Fund?

There is of course no single reason for the UK pledge of £1 billion. With any announcement of this size, a number of factors will need to be in play. In addition, whenever something goes

¹³ IDC Report on the Global Fund, May 22, 2012.

¹⁴ <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-life-saved-every-three-minutes-britain-leads-the-way-in-fight-against-hiv-aids-tb-and-malaria>.

well, each stakeholder is likely to attribute this to their own actions, as one key informant said: “Everyone wants to claim credit for the Global Fund”. This is particularly true in the interface between civil society and government. The government will want to keep a veil over their true motivations, and campaigning NGOs need to claim space and prove their worth in an increasingly competitive environment¹⁵.

The evaluation revealed a number of competing, and to a large extent over-lapping, explanations for why DfID gave £1 billion to the Global Fund. These have been distilled into three distinct ‘causal stories’:

- A. DfID funded the Global Fund with £1 billion because it was in line with key policy objectives and principles, including value for money and results
- B. DfID funded the Global Fund with £1 billion because of external pressure from the US government, specifically via the personal intervention of President Obama directly to David Cameron
- C. DfID funded the Global Fund with £1 billion because of external pressure from a well-orchestrated and wide-reaching UK campaign for £1 billion led by STOPAIDS

The following section presents the evidence to support each causal story in turn.

Causal Story A: DfID funded the Global Fund with £1 billion because it was in line with key policy objectives and priorities, including value for money and results

The evaluation found some evidence to support the argument that DfID would have pledged £1 billion anyway, in the absence of any external pressure. Following reforms, the Global Fund met a number of key criteria for DfID in terms of the need to spend, to be able to track results and to be confident in value for money.

Budget pressure

Both internal and external stakeholders identified DfID’s need to spend as a top factor in the decision. The UK had committed to meeting the ODA target of 0.7% of GNI by 2013. One key informant argued that this target would have been met by that point anyway. However, there was clearly a budget to be spent: “They literally had nowhere else to spend the money, and were desperate to find ways not to get hammered for under-spending”. In addition, it suited the Chancellor, “because it met his pledge for malaria”. Other key informants confirmed:

¹⁵ Morariu, Johanna and Brennan, Kathleen (2009) "Effective Advocacy Evaluation: The Role of Funders," The Foundation Review: Vol. 1: Iss. 3, Article 8. Available at: <http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/tfr/vol1/iss3/8/> and Jones, Harry (2011) “A guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence”, ODI Background Note, February 2011. Available at: <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6453.pdf>

It was allocated already. They did not have to do much. They looked for a wow factor. 0.7 commitment – money was there to spend and they needed to find ways to spend it quickly and easily.

DfID has raising budget, declining capacity, declining interest in HIV and health...looking for ways to spend money and get kudos.

Existing support within DfID

The relationship between DfID and the Fund is very good. If it had not been good, [the Fund] would not have received the money, even if there was advocacy.

The Fund has a reasonable level of support within DfID. The leadership role that DfID had played in the reform of the Global Fund meant that it had close insight into the process and a large stake in its success. Key informants confirmed:

DfID took over the Chair at the time [of the crisis]. There was a strong push to make it more effective, to drive through painful managerial changes.

They changed the leadership of the Fund, they changed the Secretariat, the way the Committees worked, the way the Fund makes grants.

Simon Bland, the UK's representative to the Global Fund in Geneva, and chair of the Global Fund Board until June 2013, was a strong champion. He was succeeded by Donal Brown, a 'very massive advocate for a billion'. Other internal champions included PUSS Lynne Featherstone, Anna Seymour (head of the HIV and SRHR team), regional staff in country and the UN liaison team in East Kilbride. Key informants said:

[The £1 billion pledge] was not completely out of the blue, if you look at the MAR in 2010, [the Global Fund] came out quite high.

Members of the cabinet who are personally committed spoke to No. 10 and to Justine a long time before the billion was mentioned.

Leadership of Mark Dybul

In particular, the appointment of Dr. Mark Dybul as the new Executive Director of the Fund in November 2012 was reassuring. According to one key informant the Secretary of State "had confidence in the Fund after the change in administration". Another referenced "good conversations with Justine and Mark Dybul". Although the Fund reforms were well underway throughout 2011, the Secretary of State appears to have been waiting until the appointment of a new Executive Director and to evaluate his leadership before making a commitment. It helped that having been previously in charge of PEPFAR, he was "known to senior people".

Preference for multi-lateral spending

DfID's current preference for multi-lateral aid worked in the Global Fund's favour. Although DfID has tended to prioritise bilateral spending in the past, this mode of budget support "can't be maintained with decreasing staff" at the country level, and is harder to trace in terms of results. One campaigner expressed it as follows: "It is easy to put the money into an agency and then they can criticise, easier than to do it themselves".

Ability to track expenditure/Value for money

On 24th July 2013, DfID's 'Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) Update 2013 Interim Report' stated that the Global Fund had made 'reasonable progress' on specific reform priorities identified in the 2011 MAR. By mid-2013, the Global Fund looked like a safe place for UK money to be placed, where results could be visible and quantifiable. The ability of the newly reformed Fund to track its expenditure was appealing in the results paradigm: "Delivery of results is huge. Being able to follow your money, where does each penny go?" Civil servants also liked the formulation of 'a life saved every minute for the next three years'. A campaigner said: "They can say to Cameron, there is value for money".

What are the limits of this explanation on the outcome?

In summary, there were a number of internal dynamics at play that help to explain the £1 billion pledge. It is reasonable to conclude that the UK could have renewed its pledge to the Global Fund at some point in time on this basis – but critically, it does not sufficiently explain the late timing and the amount of the pledge. In particular, interviews with campaigners suggested that the Global Fund would not have pushed for £1 billion: "They may have sold themselves short"; "We had to get the Fund behind it".

Causal Story A goes some way to explaining how DfID came to allocate a large pledge to the Global Fund. However, in interviews, many key informants raised external pressure from a range of sources as a significant element, and also spoke of the many challenges and barriers that were raised by civil servants along the way. These aspects are further explored in Causal Stories B and C.

Causal Story B: DfID funded the Global Fund with £1 billion because of external pressure from the US government, specifically via the personal intervention of President Obama directly to the UK Prime Minister

Many key informants, especially those close to the Fund and civil servants, identified the UK-US special relationship as a significant factor in the pledge decision: "The US was very active. There was lots of politics".

The US government is the largest donor to the Global Fund, but its contribution is capped at 33% of the total amount. As the host of the Fourth Replenishment Round, the US wanted to

leverage as much support from other donors as possible, and therefore announced its support early. In 2012, Congress approved \$1.65 billion for the Global Fund for federal year 2013, as confirmed in April 2013¹⁶.

On 13th May 2013, a press conference was held at the White House on the occasion of David Cameron's state visit to Washington. According to key informants, considerable effort was made to ensure that President Obama would give a "clear, strong endorsement" of the Global Fund in his remarks as follows:

*Today we're reaffirming our commitment to global development. Specifically, we're encouraged by the ambitious reforms underway at the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, where both of our nations are stepping up our efforts*¹⁷.

The President also met with Cameron to personally push the case, and he was supportive of a large pledge:

Obama arranged a meeting directly with the PM. Had the decision been for a lower amount, there may have been greater pressure (from No.10) to revise it upwards.

It was helpful that Obama had met with Cameron, we knew he would not be against the pledge.

The evaluation also found some evidence that the Gates Foundation had played a facilitation role in the US-UK relationship: "Gates have enormous influence with current DfID ministers and senior civil servants, as demonstrated with the planning of FP2020". Bill Gates met with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State in April 2013.

What are the limits of this explanation on the outcome?

In summary, it seems plausible that the US government was able to pave the way for a large UK pledge in a number of key ways:

1. By making a large, early pledge themselves
2. By setting a cap on the total amount, thus providing a leverage model for the UK to follow
3. By ensuring that David Cameron would not be against a pledge
4. By preparing David Cameron to push for a larger pledge if it was for a lower amount than £1 billion

However, although many people close to the decision interviewed during the evaluation referenced the US pressure high on the list of reasons for the pledge, it was always mentioned as one of a number of decisive factors. If the US voice had been the only factor in the

¹⁶ <http://theglobalfight.org/presidents-fy14-budget-reaffirms-commitment-to-global-fund/>

¹⁷ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/13/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-united-kingdom-joint->

decision, this suggests that the UK would have moved earlier, before the mini-MAR. Significantly, one key informant close to the process suggested that even the Prime Minister was not able to get Justine Greening to move more quickly: “Someone (in Washington) said to Cameron if the UK could make an earlier announcement. He looked into it, but it got frozen...we tried hard with STOPAIDS for a June decision but the Secretary of State wanted to wait”. Another key informant suggested that the current Secretary of State experiences less interference from the Prime Minister than her predecessor: “she has more leeway”.

The evaluation found low awareness of the role played by the US government among UK civil society campaigners in that it was only mentioned as a factor by two individuals. Unfortunately it was outside the scope of this evaluation to explore the connections between US and UK activists in this regard. However, according to STOPAIDS, “[the secretariat] consistently linked with US colleagues, and often provided DfID with civil society insights into the views of the US government”.

Causal Story C: DfID funded the Global Fund with £1 billion because of external pressure from a well-orchestrated and wide-reaching UK campaign for £1 billion led by STOPAIDS

This causal story hinges on two sets of evidence. Firstly, there is STOPAIDS own version of events, which contains a number of elements that cast doubt on the argument that DfID would have funded the Global Fund without external pressure.

Secondly, there is strong testimony from key informants as to the role that civil society and public support played, in the visible form of the campaign by STOPAIDS.

a. The £1 billion campaign: The story according to STOPAIDS

STOPAIDS began intensively advocating for a UK Fourth Replenishment pledge as early as 2010:

The replenishment effort started in earnest in the aftermath of the election when we first heard from DfID that the Multilateral Aid Review may rule out making a pledge at the 2010 replenishment conference.

A working group of members was put together which included Results UK, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance, Oxfam, the APPG on HIV&AIDS, and STOPAIDS trustee Robin Gorna. A key informant who was part of this effort said: “It was a long road, we never stopped”. At this point the ask was for a doubling of UK aid:

The justification for the delay was the MAR – right up until the launch of the High Level Panel, the expectation was that the positive MAR outcome would lead to an increase – hopefully a doubling – in the short-run.

The Multi-lateral Aid Review (MAR), 2010-2011

STOPAIDS liaised closely with the Global Fund and coordinated submissions of evidence to the MAR from UK civil society. However just weeks after this positive outcome, the Global Fund scandal broke. In an email to STOPAIDS in October that year, Simon Bland stated that a doubling to the Global Fund “will be very problematic given what is going on there”. Throughout 2011 and into 2012, STOPAIDS campaigned intensively to support the Fund through the crisis, especially with regard to the reforms that were instigated as a result.

In the meantime, pressure was maintained at the ministerial level. On World AIDS Day 2011, STOPAIDS arranged a meeting with the Secretary of State, the CEO of CAFOD and Annie Lennox, to present a letter endorsed by over 30 organisations, as well as Elton John and Desmond Tutu. STOPAIDS also placed positive language into the Deputy Prime Minister’s recorded World AIDS Day message via an intervention from Mark Lancaster MP, the Permanent Private Secretary to Andrew Mitchell.

In January 2012, STOPAIDS proposed a global call for an emergency replenishment within the first 200 days of 2012 (using the countdown to the International AIDS Conference in Washington DC 22-27 July 2012), which commenced with a Global Fund Day of Action on 28th January¹⁸. This work seemed to get some traction, with positive discussions taking place in March between DfID, the Fund and STOPAIDS around a possible announcement at the G20 in Mexico. According to STOPAIDS:

At numerous points at this time DFID assured us that an announcement was imminent and began coordinating on choreography.

IDC Enquiry, 2012

Although the MAR had positive findings, the Global Fund crisis still threatened its position. A key focus of STOPAIDS’ advocacy effort was to secure an International Development Committee hearing, which took place on 17th April 2012. STOPAIDS successfully lobbied Ivan Lewis MP to call for the enquiry and also cultivated the backing of Michael McCann MP, who played a key role in interrogating the Secretary of State at the hearing. The Chair of the Board of STOPAIDS, Mike Podmore, and a key member of the STOPAIDS coalition, Results UK, presented oral evidence¹⁹. STOPAIDS submitted written evidence on behalf of several agencies and subsequently lobbied to shape the findings of the report: ‘we received feedback from a committee member that they had worked to strengthen the line in their final Global Fund report following our lobbying’.

¹⁸ As confirmed by email correspondence between Diarmaid McDonald and Sharonann Lynch MSF, 28-29 November 2011.

¹⁹ <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/Formal-Mins-2010-12-Consolidated%20Version.pdf>

“Shifting goal posts”

By the beginning of June however, it was already clear that an announcement would not be imminent, or even possible at the UNGA in September. An email from the Global Fund team to STOPAIDS reiterated the need for Andrew Mitchell to ‘be led by the evidence – and we may not have it by then’.

The STOPAIDS discussion paper published that summer set out a number of serious challenges facing HIV advocacy efforts:

While maintaining a level of commitment (including to the Global Fund), DfID has moved away from specific support to HIV in favour of other institutional priorities, such as maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH). In addition, the agency and the UK Coalition Government have generally proven less receptive to ‘traditional’ lobbying and campaigning on HIV²⁰.

In September 2012, STOPAIDS was then presented with another challenge by the departure of Andrew Mitchell. They had to re-establish a relationship with DfID that took the new context into account. In a way, this was an opportunity as much as a setback – a clean slate with which to re-open the question of the pledge with only one year to go. This is how one NGO close to the campaign described what happened:

When the Secretary of State came in, we knew she was not interested in development, it was a demotion for her. In the first year she was de-prioritising health. She was not interested. We had to re-build the relationship with DfID after the change in the leadership.

The final push: September 2012-2013

We will effectively fight for full UK financing for the global AIDS response and the Global Fund. As the second biggest donor to the global response, the UK is vital to turning the tide of the epidemic. We will secure a £1bn replenishment from the UK to the Fund, and ensure they engage to improve the effectiveness of its work; as well as at least maintaining bilateral investments in HIV.

- STOPAIDS Advocacy Strategy 2013-2016

STOPAIDS again sought to renew advocacy efforts in the autumn of 2012. The timeline for the replenishment was now in their favour, as it did not seem unreasonable to ask what the intentions for a renewal might be: ‘with replenishment only a year away, it was a clear ask, easy to open the dialogue’.

The strategic approach that STOPAIDS took from September 2012 onwards was based on three pillars: coordination, making the technical case and building political will.

²⁰ STOPAIDS Discussion Paper, August 2012.

Coordination

STOPAIDS continued to play an important convening and coordination role, fostering effective collaboration both within the network, but also beyond the network, including internationally. In the UK, efforts were made to widen the coalition, securing ONE as a new member, encouraging Malaria No More to focus on the Global Fund and securing a letter from the British Overseas Aid Group (BOAG)²¹ to Justine Greening in support of a doubling. Internationally, STOPAIDS helped to establish the Global Fund Advocacy Network (GFAN) and actively engaged in planning and coordination with international colleagues, including close working relationships with key international allies.

By January 2013, a core advocacy group within STOPAIDS had coalesced which consisted of Results UK, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance, ONE, Malaria No More and the STOPAIDS secretariat. This group also had close links into the advocacy work of both the Elton John AIDS Foundation and the Gates Foundation. STOPAIDS arranged and led regular UK civil society calls and planning meetings to secure agreement on strategic approach, division of responsibilities and creation of policy and campaign content. The STOPAIDS secretariat was also the key liaison for civil society with both DfID and the Global Fund, securing and coordinating civil society meetings with the DfID Global Fund team, and coordinating Global Fund engagement with UK civil society including facilitating calls, meetings and information sharing.

Articulation of the technical case for support

Thanks to long-established and trusted relationships with both civil servants and the Global Fund, STOPAIDS was well-positioned to build a technical case for an early and large pledge. STOPAIDS worked closely with DfID Global Fund team on their positions in advance of board meetings and their engagement with ministers, building strong relationships in particular with Simon Bland and Carlton Evans. Notably, STOPAIDS contributed to the creation of evidence papers for key decision-makers linking replenishment to the new DfID priorities on women & girls and economic growth, and making the case for the Global Fund²².

HIV was thought to have had its day, there was no focus at all from Andrew Mitchell or Justine Greening. Civil society had to fight to link Global Fund outcomes to DfID priorities.

During the mini-MAR in 2012, STOPAIDS again coordinated and submitted evidence, liaising closely with the Global Fund on their input: “We spent a lot of time engaging malaria and TB people to get figures on the numbers of lives that could be saved”.

²¹ BOAG members are Oxfam, Christian Aid, ActionAid, Save the Children and CAFOD.

²² Why Stop Now? A UK blueprint for UK leadership in the HIV response, 2012.

Building the political incentives for support

At the ministerial level, STOPAIDS began by placing a lot of emphasis on recruiting Lynne Featherstone, the new Permanent Under Secretary of State for International Development (PUSS). Featherstone was known to be strong on health and HIV issues:

We opened up very effective lines of communication with the new Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, establishing a much stronger relationship than with her predecessor.

As part of this relationship building, Student Stop AIDS Campaigners met with Lynne Featherstone on 18th April 2013: “We asked her for the UK pledge to be increased to double the previous figure and she said that DFID would consider an increase of up to double”²³.

World AIDS Day 2012: Why Stop Now?

A key focus in autumn 2012 was to secure the first Secretary of State speech on HIV by Justine Greening at a World AIDS Day panel event on 28th November, successfully achieved by framing the event around a topic that was high on her agenda – the private sector.

To further mark World AIDS Day, STOPAIDS launched the Why Stop Now campaign²⁴, which called on the UK government to renew its leadership on HIV and AIDS. An e-action generated 3000 signatures and was promoted on twitter by Stephen Fry. STOPAIDS social media activity within the Why Stop Now campaign is estimated to have reached 7.5 million people. MPs were directly lobbied by the Student Stop AIDS Campaign network and as part of WAD, drew attention to support for the Global Fund in constituency and local press. In addition, a national speaker tour with people living with HIV highlighted the importance of the Global Fund.

All Party Parliamentary Group on HIV&AIDS

Throughout 2012 and 2013, STOPAIDS part-funded and closely coordinated with the APPG on HIV&AIDS to build cross-party parliamentary support via a series of events and activities. A 90-minute parliamentary debate was held on 19th December 2012 led by Pauline Latham MP. In order to give MPs and Peers the evidence they needed to defend the Fund, STOPAIDS organized a trip to the Global Fund secretariat in Geneva with Lord Fowler, Tony Cunningham MP of the Labour shadow development team and Nick Herbert MP in March 2012. STOPAIDS also worked closely with Conservative, Lib Dem, Labour and Green MPs including individual briefing meetings and mobilisations around key moments. For World AIDS Day, over 50 MPs showed their support for the Why Stop Now campaign.

²³ <http://students.stopaidscampaign.org/2013/04/1423/>

²⁴ [Why Stop Now? A UK Blueprint for UK Leadership in the HIV Response](#)


According to Ben Simms, this investment of money, time and expertise in the APPG “generated many wins” including Lords Howard and Fowler’s high-level advocacy with senior policymakers (Lord Fowler led a debate in the House of Lords on 4th July 2012 at which twelve speakers from both sides of the House urged the UK government to release its long-awaited contribution without delay), and the successful collaboration with TB & Malaria APPGs to deliver a well-attended “confidence building” parliamentary event with the Global Fund’s new Executive Director, Mark Dybul and Board Chair Simon Bland in April 2013:

Responding to questions about the amount and timing of UK’s future contribution to the fund, DFID minister Lynne Featherstone MP said that they were in discussions and hoped to make an announcement “very soon”.

Global Fund Action Day, June 2013

The high point of public campaigning around the Global Fund specifically however came in the form of a high profile Global Fund Action Day on 6th June 2013, in which supporters and student groups were invited to take part in an international twitter action calling on the Secretary of State to give £1 billion to the Global Fund. As part of this action, STOPAIDS allies were able to mobilise celebrity endorsement. Sir Elton John published an opinion piece in the Guardian on the importance of Global Fund replenishment, also specifically calling for £1 billion²⁵. Advocacy intensified following the outcome of the mini-MAR on 24th July until the time of the announcement in late September.

Results Chain for STOPAIDS advocacy on the Global Fund:



b. Testimony from key informants

High-level recognition of the role played by civil society

Given that civil servants and politicians are notoriously reluctant to acknowledge the power of external pressure on their decision-making, the evaluation found considerable openness

²⁵ http://london.ejaf.org/aids-news/elton_john_g8/

about the role that civil society played in the process. All the current or former civil servants spoken to concurred on this.

It was not guaranteed, it could have been a lot less – civil society voice and noise played a part in this.

STOPAIDS was a large visible constituency by virtue of its own Student Stop AIDS Campaign and the large public networks associated with ONE and Results UK. Letter-writing campaigns to MPs and student demonstrations were an effective counter-balance to the fear of the tabloids. As one key informant put it, “Ministers must see a public interest. They need some kind of persuasion that there will be support from the public and not a bad reaction”. STOPAIDS was smart in the way that it presented this as an opportunity to DfID: “We told them ‘we will praise you loudly’”.

According to those close to the decision-making process, public perception was a factor in the decision:

It was helpful to see the groundswell of opinion in the public. MPs got a lot of letters.

They presented the win-win very well. They did an incredible work to give a positive message after the pledge. One billion was a cheap way to get a big communications win.

STOPAIDS was definitely galvanising supporters through grassroots and social media.

A new Secretary of State: *No one thought that we would get her to give a billion*

The fact that health, and specifically HIV, was not a policy priority for the Secretary of State Justine Greening upon her arrival at DfID is well-known and was confirmed in all interviews with key informants. Civil servants confirmed that “health was not a top priority”. In addition to this, Greening, with her background in accountancy, was “combing all expenditure with a fine toothcomb”. The mini-MAR was one aspect of this and she clearly wanted to wait for its completion before making any announcement. The commitment made by previous Secretary of State Andrew Mitchell and DfID’s support for the Fund was therefore now “by no means certain”.

My sense is that health took a slight back seat after she came in, as policy and communications priorities. (Civil servant)

The Ministry was not favourable initially.

DfID were saying a much lower figure, they were not confident [the minister] would sign it off.

The biggest obstacle was convincing Justine that it was value for money and she would not be criticised by the public.

A significant win was to get back where we were. Within a year she had made a major announcement.

Campaigners expressed similar views to civil servants as to the reasons for Justine Greening's journey from lack of interest to major donor:

The thing that moved Justine was the general public.

Greening felt the pressure by different factions, she heard it from the public, from lots of different sources, from MPs, and within her team.

She got the message relentlessly from civil society, celebrities and other government and UN agencies – towards the middle of 2013 her rhetoric changed.

The opportunity to announce it was a profile building exercise for her.

The £1 billion ask

There is little doubt that the £1 billion ask first came from civil society, as confirmed by civil servants in interviews. It was specifically Diane Sheard at ONE who worked out the calculations. She argued it should be double what they had spent (£540 million), not what they had pledged (£384 million): “We raised expectations and raised the bar”.

Many of the advocates felt the time that this goal was ‘very ambitious’, given the situation the Fund was in and the context at the time, but enough felt it was ‘doable’ or ‘realistic’:

We knew it was a nice round figure. We knew we were chancing our arm.

According to some, advocates were encouraged by civil servants to be ambitious:

We pitched the billion to the Global Fund team, they never pushed back and said ‘no, that is ridiculous’.

An alternative explanation for the £1 billion was presented by some key informants:

I think when DfID were doing the maths, they were at 800 or 900 million. They thought they could push to a billion if it was no more than 10% of the total replenishment. An exchange rate of 1.5 meant that 1.5 billion US dollars would be 1 billion sterling. They could sell it to the public and the PM. If you stretch it to a billion with conditions, it sounds constructive and it encourages the others.

This methodology however was clearly thought up after advocates had presented £1 billion, rather than beforehand, as the following comment shows: “We first heard of the billion when ONE got in touch. We were pretty dismissive. The methodology was spurious”. Apparently, however, the idea appealed to policymakers: “It was a nice round number, worked well in messaging”.

We came up with it around March. Some would recognise that the first time a billion was talked about was from civil society. The trick is to make them think that it was their idea.

Resistance from senior civil servants

HIV has very much lost its leading position in terms of advocacy and prominence within DfID HQ dialogue. The HIV position paper has no political visibility in the organisation at all.²⁶

In order to win the support of the Minister, it was critical to have senior civil servants and the Global Fund team fully behind the £1 billion ask. Not everyone in DfID liked the Fund. In interviews, civil servants revealed a number of objections that were raised, including ‘nervousness’ about a pledge of that size, the fear of a backlash in the media, preference for bilateral aid, the need for a new instrument, the priority for malaria as opposed to HIV, the riskiness of giving to the Fund, which ‘came so close to imploding’ and it not being ‘value for money’. In addition, the Global Fund team itself appeared to have no direct line to the Minister until midway through 2013.

The main opponents were inside DfID. There are those who favour bilateral aid. Especially with a pledge of that size, there would be some resistance.

Throughout most of 2012 it looked very risky – when the AP story broke. [A key civil servant] was negative behind the scenes. There were conversations where Mitchell said to MPs in private, it is not value for money.

Giving a billion to poor people with a nasty illness will not win Middle England.

That is where the NGOs and STOPAIDS come in by talking to the critics in the ministry.

The fear of a backlash from the UK press was evident in the choice of location for the announcement at the UN General Assembly in New York, at which only one UK newspaper was invited to attend.

Strong cross-party parliamentary support

Many informants raised the value of strong parliamentary support as a key element of the growing ‘noise’ in support of the Fund. At the time, this was fed back to STOPAIDS by civil servants: “Ministers are very aware of the support in parliament”.

Although not all those interviewed saw this as part of the STOPAIDS campaign, there is strong evidence to support a causal link between the work of the STOPAIDS secretariat and the advisor to the APPG HIV&AIDS to the mobilisation of much of this backing: “The

²⁶ Bellwether interview with key informant.

priority we gave to funding the APPG and supporting the work of the policy adviser was also a critical contribution in building parliamentary support”.

The policy case

Justine Greening’s top priorities on appointment were women and girls; economic development; and support for humanitarian disasters. A key action that STOPAIDS took was to publish briefing papers connecting support for the Global Fund with issues that resonated with her. The evaluation found evidence of this strategy being successful, in the sense that key informants inside DfID were able to articulate the funding as being “consistent with overall priorities” and identified it as “a win in policy terms”.

Clearly there are many aspects to the headline figures – the three diseases disproportionately affect women and girls and impact on poverty. The funding is consistent with overall priorities.

Support for the Fund delivers a number of DFID’s health objectives, including for malaria – where the UK has committed ‘to help at least ten high burden countries halve the number of malaria deaths between 2010 and 2015, and sustain these gains into the future’.²⁷

Perspectives of external stakeholders

External stakeholders held a variety of views on the extent to which the advocacy coordinated by STOPAIDS could take credit for the announcement. At one end, there was a view that STOPAIDS had played an enabling role: “It might have been a billion anyway, but the campaign demonstrated why it was a political win.” At the other end was a belief that “it would not have happened without them”.

Certainly they contributed a large contribution to the UK Global Fund announcement.

STOP AIDS should take a large portion of credit for getting us there - they brought us all together and represented us.

I don't think it would have happened without STOPAIDS. Even with Gates.

It would not have happened without them. They made the momentum real. Coordination function was very smart.

The £1 billion was a huge success for STOPAIDS. The NGOs and STOPAIDS played a very critical role both in the lead up to the pledge and after the pledge. They helped

²⁷ Point 9 of the DfID press release announcing the £1 billion pledge on 23 September 2013: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-life-saved-every-three-minutes-britain-leads-the-way-in-fight-against-hiv-aids-tb-and-malaria>

to make the argument, to frame it. They knew how to communicate it, told DfID that a number like that would achieve the purpose of investing the money in the best way and it could be communicated well.

Defining the specific contribution of STOPAIDS

We are particularly grateful to the UK civil society, which has dedicated every effort to advocate for a substantial increase in funding. Thanks to your work and dedication, the UK has been able to demonstrate extraordinary leadership in the fight against the three diseases.

- Mark Dybul, CEO of the Global Fund

The evaluation found that STOPAIDS played a key role in the UK decision to pledge £1 billion to the Global Fund. In this section, the unique contribution made by the secretariat of STOPAIDS is explored in more depth.

Convening power

As a network, STOPAIDS is a ready-made ‘coalition’. However, STOPAIDS did not simply build a coalition of its members in support of the Fund. It also critically brought key allies outside of its members, such as ONE (who became members of STOPAIDS) and Malaria No More, into a specific working group or ‘hub’, linking up with the AIDS and TB communities already represented in STOPAIDS’ membership. For the larger NGOs, being able to be active in the campaign behind the scenes was said to be helpful.

They played the role of coordinator and convener extremely well.

The result was bigger than anyone could have delivered on their own.

They played a convening role with advocacy and also as an NGO in their own right in campaigning and in both they did a good job.

DfID want one connection.

If not STOPAIDS, it would depend on individual organisations, it would be less well coordinated.



A visual representation of the advocacy working group that STOPAIDS led and coordinated on the Global Fund

Campaign strategy and coordination

Although several organisations were in a strong position to have played the role of campaign coordinator, the offer made by STOPAIDS was readily accepted by all involved and by all accounts was highly appreciated. STOPAIDS presented a number of key advantages in terms of coordination in that it had a strong history of delivering on advocacy campaigns, a dedicated staff officer for the role, excellent relationships with key advocacy targets and itself was not a recipient of Global Fund monies. In speaking about key strengths of the organisation, members commented:

Leadership in building relationships. STOPAIDS is now operating at a level way beyond anything it was doing before, at a first class level.

The role of the advocacy manager was really key in terms of coordination, liaison with Global Fund team at DfID.

Outstanding in communicating. Always ready to jump on a call, asked the right questions. They did a very good job of corralling us all.

STOPAIDS has huge credibility within civil society internationally in the South and in the UK with policymakers and from international institutions.

Advocacy tactics

External stakeholders, including advocacy targets, also highly praised STOPAIDS' advocacy and campaigning approach:

What was good was that it was not 'in your face' advocacy, it was more thoughtful and sophisticated.

Their big strength is targeting the right people.

STOPAIDS are quite persistent; it is very beneficial...There has been very constructive dialogue over the years.

Speaking with one voice

Putting in £1bn over the next 3 years will boost the Global Fund's ability to achieve its goals and persuade others to do the right thing too. By capitalising on a historic opportunity now, Aids won't need to be on the table when the UK chairs the G8 in 2021 – Elton John²⁸

²⁸ Elton John made a number of important interventions, including meeting with the Prime Minister and Andrew Mitchell in May 2011, and writing in the Guardian on 7th June 2013: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/07/make-aids-history>

Critically for the success of this campaign, the coalition was connected at a global level to civil society in the US, and through its members had multiple connections to the Gates Foundation and the Global Fund itself. Great effort was made to ensure that everyone from the Global Fund, to Bono and Elton John, were communicating the same message of £1 billion.

Having officials make the case is fine, but having multiple sources of advocacy saying the same thing was quite strong.

We all stuck to the number.

Other people were speaking up for the Fund – NGOs and campaigners, Parliamentarians - cross party support, Elton John...

STOPAIDS then worked hard to secure buy-in for £1billion, coaching the Global Fund staff as well as ensuring it was adopted across UK civil society.

A second aspect to this was the consensus building effort that STOPAIDS made across the wider sector, such that there was no briefing against the Fund by leading development NGOs. One key informant said, “the biggest enemy (to HIV) are parts of the development sector”.

Cultivation of Lynne Featherstone

STOPAIDS made a point of building a close relationship with the PUSS Lynne Featherstone. This proved to be useful especially when it came to the decision around the timing and details of the announcement. According to campaigners, this was successful in creating pressure from the Liberal Democrats to take ownership of the pledge announcement, and for Nick Clegg to want to make the announcement himself.

The coalition politics worked in our favour. Lynne made sure the LibDems wanted to own the announcement. We would not have been successful without targeting Lynne, working closely with her.

Although there are discussions about the degree of influence PUSS had on the decision, there was no doubt about her being part of an internal lobby in favour of the Fund replenishment.

STOPAIDS did an excellent job of engaging her from the very beginning.

Summary of STOPAIDS role and influence in key factors that went into the decision:

<i>Factor in the £1 billion decision</i>	<i>Role and influence of STOPAIDS</i>
<i>'Political win' (public support)</i>	<i>STOPAIDS mobilised visible public support for the Global Fund</i>
<i>Parliamentary support</i>	<i>Working closely with the three APPGs, STOPAIDS facilitated high level advocacy by peers and MPs</i>
<i>Policy</i>	<i>STOPAIDS effectively linked HIV to top priorities: women & girls and economic development</i>
<i>Civil servant support</i>	<i>STOPAIDS worked closely with Global Fund team and PUSS to cultivate support</i>
<i>Value for money/results</i>	<i>STOPAIDS supported Global Fund reforms and made technical case for number of lives saved</i>
<i>Need to spend</i>	<i>STOPAIDS has advocated for 0.7% for over two decades</i>
<i>Celebrity endorsement (Bono, Elton John, Bill Gates)</i>	<i>A strategy of the STOPAIDS advocacy working group (ONE) and wider network (EJAF/BMGF) uniting under STOPAIDS messaging of £1billion.</i>

Conclusion

The evaluation revealed a number of competing, and to a large extent over-lapping, explanations for why DfID gave £1 billion to the Global Fund. The aim was not to single out one Causal Story, but to evaluate the relative weight of each story to the bigger picture in light of the available evidence, in order to determine if the intervention by STOPAIDS made a crucial contribution (as per the Oxfam process tracing draft protocol).

Of the three stories, Causal Story A is the least credible. Without external efforts by civil society, the Global Fund, and other actors, including the US government, to overcome the reluctance of the Secretary of State and senior civil servants within DfID, it is very unlikely that the Global Fund would have been awarded £1 billion by the UK.

Causal Story B has some weight, but is insufficient to explain the outcome. In particular, there is compelling evidence that the £1 billion ask came first from civil society and that the support of the British public, over which US voices (including the Gates Foundation) have no sway, was a key element in the decision.

Outright success in advocacy is rare. It is also to be expected that campaigners would claim the result as an advocacy win. However, strong testimony from civil servants, those with very little vested interest, identified a causal link between the pledge, the £1 billion amount, strong public support and the actions of STOPAIDS. This testimony provides a counter balance to the theory that a combination of Causal Stories A and B could explain the outcome without reference to Causal Story C.

The conclusion drawn by this evaluation is therefore that DfID funded the Global Fund with £1 billion because the Secretary of State was fully persuaded that it was in line with key policy objectives and internal priorities, and - following extensive Global Fund reforms and close scrutiny from two review processes - concluded it was in DfID's best interests to do so, by a range of external actors including the US government, and a well-orchestrated and wide-reaching campaign for £1 billion led by STOPAIDS.

Two important aspects should be noted by funders of advocacy work such as this. Firstly, it was not a 'quick win' – the outcome was the result of many years of sustained campaigning to ensure the aid commitment of the UK to 0.7% of GNI and specifically three years of activity in support of the Global Fund. Secondly, what made the difference was a relatively modest investment to fund a fulltime staff person to undertake this key coordination and campaigning role and donor support that was trusting and flexible enough to allow for adaptation of the strategy as needed.